professors as free to profess as believers are to believe. The university takes shape as a kind of walled city. In the hlerarchlcal world of the mlddle ages, unlversltles were legally walled, that is, students and professors were a privileged group, protected from penalties and punishments meted out to ordinary men. But this was a functlon of the integrat~on of the universit~es and the church (students and professors had clerlcal status) and then of the church and the state. Precisely because of this integration, scholars did not enjoy the privilege of heret~cal thought. Today the un~versit~es are intellectually though not legally walled; students and professors have no legal privileges, but they are, in principle at least, absolutely free In the sphere of knowledge.2 Privately or collectively, they can crltlclze, question, doubt, or reject the established creeds of thelr society. Or, what is more likely In any relatively stable society, they can elaborate the established creeds, most often in conventional, but somet~mes in novel and experimental ways.
Similarly, again, the separation of clvil soclety and polit~cal communlty creates the sphere of economic competition and free enterprise, the market in commodities, labor, and capltal. I will focus for now on the first of these three and adopt the largest view of market freedom. On this view, the buyers and sellers of commodities are entlrely at liberty to strike any bargaln they wish, buylng anything, selling anything, at any prlce they can agree upon, without the interference of state officials.
There is no such thing as ajust prlce, or at least there 1s no enforcement of a just price; and, similarly, there are not sumptuary laws, no restrictions on usury, no quality or safety standards, no mlnimum wage, and so on. The maxlm caveat ernptor, let the buyer beware, suggests that market freedom entails certain risks for consumers. But so does relig~ous freedom. Some people buy unsafe products and some people are converted to false doctrines. Free men and women must bear such risks. I have my doubts about the analogy, since unsafe products pose actual, and false doctrines only speculative, risks, but I won't pursue this argument here. My immediate purpose is not to cr~ticize but only to describe the map the liberals drew, and on that map the commodity was glven at least as much room as the creed.
Another example: the abolition of dynastic government separates family and state and makes possible the political verslon of the "career open to talents," the highest form, we might say, of the labor market.
Only the eldest male In a certain line can be a klng, but anyone can be a president or prime minister. More generally, the line that marks off polit~cal and social posltion from familial property creates the sphere of office and then the freedom to compete for bureaucratic and professional place, to lay claim to a vocation, apply for an appointment, develop a specialty, and so on. The notion of one's life as one's project probably has its origin here. It is to be contrasted with the notion of one's life as one's inheritance-on the one hand, the predetermination of birth and blood; on the other, the self-determination of struggle and achievement.
Finally, the separation of public and private life creates the sphere of individual and familial freedom, privacy and domesticity. Most recently, this has been described as a sphere of sexual freedom; so it is, but it isn't originally or primarily that; it is designed to encompass a very wide range of interests and activities-whatever we choose to do, short of incest, rape, and murder, in our own homes or among our friends and relatives: reading books, talking politics, keeping a journal, teaching what we know to our children, cultivating (or, for that matter, neglecting) our gardens. Our homes are our castles, and there we are free from official surveillance. This is, perhaps, the freedom that we most take for granted-the two-way television screens of Orwell's 1984 are a particularly frightening piece of science fiction-so it is worth stressing how rare a freedom it is in human history. "Our homes are our castles" was first of all the claim of people whose castles were their homes, and it was for a very long time an effective claim only for them. Now its denial is an occasion for indignation and outrage even among ordinary citizens. We greatly value our privacy, whether or not we do odd and exciting things in private.3
The art of separation has never been highly regarded on the left, especially the Marxist left, where it is commonly seen as an ideological rather than a practical enterprise. Leftists have generally stressed both the radical interdependence of the different social spheres and the direct and indirect causal links that radiate outwards from the economy. The liberal map is a pretense, on the Marxist view, an elaborate exercise in hypocrisy, for in fact the prevailing religious creeds are adapted to the ideological requirements of a capitalist society; and the universities are organized to reproduce the higher echelons of the capitalist work force; and the market position of the largest companies and corporations is subsidized and guaranteed by the capitalist state; and offices, though not legally ~n h e r~t a b l e , are nevertheless passed on and exchanged within a cap~talist power elite; and we are free In our homes only so long as what we d o there 1s harmless and w~t h o u t prejudice to the cap~talist order. Liberals draw lines and call them walls, as if they had the material force of brick or stone, but they are only lines, one-dimensional, doctrinal, ~nsubstant~al.
world IS still an organic whole, The contemporary s o c~a l less different from feudalism than we mlght thlnk. Land has been replaced by moveable wealth as the dominant good, and while that replacement reverberates through all the spheres of s o c~a l life, ~t doesn't alter their deep connectedness.
And yet Marx also believed that the liberal art of separation had been all too successful, creating, as he wrote In h~s essay on the J e w~s h quest~on, "an lndiv~dual separated from the community, w~thdrawn Into h~mself, wholly pre-occupied w~t h h~s private Interest and acting in accordance w~t h h~s I shall want to come back to t h~s prlvate ~a~r~c e . '~ argument later on for ~t makes an Important polnt about the theoretical foundat~ons of the liberal enterprise. For now, however, ~t IS enough to say that In Marx's eyes even the egotlsm of the separated lndiv~dual was a s o c~a l product-requ~red, Indeed, by the relat~ons of product~on and then reproduced In all the spheres of s o c~a l actlvity Society remalned an organ~zed whole even if ~t s members had lost thelr sense of connectlon. It was the goal of M a r x~s t politlcs to restore that sense, or, better, to brlng men and women t o a new understanding of thelr connectedness and so enable them to take control of thelr common life. For Marx, separatlon, Insofar as ~t was real, was something to be overcome. Separated ~nst~tutlons-churches, unlverslties, even families-have no part In h~s program; t h e~r distlnctlve problems will be solved only by a s o c~a l revolut~on. Soc~ety, for Marx, IS always ruled as a whole, now by aslngle class, ult~mately by all of ~t s members worklng together. The leftlst crlt~que of liberal separatlon m~g h t , however, take a different form, holding that liberalism served particular s o c~a l interests and lim~ted and adapted ~t s art to that servlce. What is necessary IS t o make the art ~mpartlal-or, if that IS a utopian project, at least to make ~t serve a w~d e r range of Interests. As the lnstltutlons of c~v i l society were protected from state power, so now they must be protected, and the state too, from the new power that arises w~t h l n civil soclety ~tself, the power of wealth. The polnt IS Soc~ety 1s Indeed all of a plece, at least In t h~s sense: that ~t s varlous parts bear a family resemblance to one another, the outward reflect~on of an Internal genetlc (soc~olog~cal, determlnatlon. But not b~olog~cal) thls family resemblance leaves a great deal of room for the soc~ological verslons of sibling rivalry and manta1 discord and grown-up children w~t h apartments of t h e~r own. So the b~shops of the church crltlclze nat~onal defense policy, the unlversltles harbor radical diss~dents, the state subs~dizes but also regulates corporate actlvlty, and so on. In each case, lnstitutlons are responslve to t h e~r own Internal loglc even while they are also responslve to systemlc determ~nat~ons. The play of internal loglc can only be repressed by tyrannical force, crosslng the lines, breaklng through the walls established by the art of separatlon. Liberalism 1s best understood as an argument agalnst that sort of repression. It would be a meaningless argument, and tyranny a superfluous politics, unless Independent churches and unlversltles, and autonomous states, really ex~sted or m~g h t really exlst In the world. But they can and sometimes do exlst. The art of separatlon IS not an illusory or fantast~c enterprise;~t 1s a morally and polit~cally necessary adaptat~on to the complex~t~es of modern life. Liberal theory reflects and reinforces a long-term process of soc~al different~at~on. I shall want to argue that liberal theor~sts often m~sunderstand t h~s process, but at least they recognize ~t s s~gnificance. Marx~st wrlters tend to deny the s~gnificance of the process. It IS, on their vlew, a transformat~on that doesn't make a substantla1 difference, an event or a serles of events that takes place largely In the world of appearances. Liberal freedoms are, all of them, unreal. As the formal freedom of the worker is only a mask for wage slavery, so religious liberty, academic freedom, free enterprise, selfdetermination, and privacy are masks for continued or reiterated subjection: the forms are new, but the content is old. The difficulty with this view is that it doesn't connect in any plausible way with the actual experience of contemporary politics; it has a quality of abstraction and theoretical willfulness. No one who has lived in an illiberal state is going to accept this devaluation of the range of liberal freedoms. The achievement of liberalism is real even if it is incomplete. But the recognition of this achievement is difficult within a Marxist framework: for the commitment t o organic wholeness and deep structural transformation doesn't readily accommodate separated spheres and autonomous institutions. Nor is it my purpose here t o try to work out such an accommodation. I want instead to pursue the alternative criticism that liberals have not been serious enough about their own art. And I want to suggest that where they have been serious they have been guided by an inadequate and misleading theory. As with other forms of social life and political action, the liberal enterprise lends itself to more than one interpretation.
The art of separation doesn't make only for liberty but also for equality Consider again, one by one, the examples with which I 6egan. Religious liberty annuls the coercive power of political and ecclesiastical officials. Hence it creates, in principle, the priesthood of all believers, that is, it leaves all believers equally free to seek their own salvation; and ~t tends to create, in practice, churches dominated by laymen rather than by priests. Academic freedom provides theoretical, if not always practical, protection for autonomous universities, within which it is difficult to sustain the privileged position of rich or aristocratic children. The free market is open t o all comers, without regard to race o r creed; alien and pariah groups commonly exploit its opportunities; and though it yields unequal results, these results never simply reproduce the hierarchy of blood or caste or, for that matter, of "merit. Under the aegis of the art of separation, liberty and equality go together. Indeed, they invite a single definition: we can say that a (modern, complex, and differentiated) society enjoys both freedom and equality when success in one institutional setting isn't convertible into success in another, that is, when the separations hold, when political power doesn't shape the church or religious zeal the state, and so on. There are, of course, constraints and inequalities within each institutional setting, but we will have little reason to worry about these if they reflect the internal logic of institutions and ~r'actices (or, as I have already argued in Spheres ofJust~ce, if social goods like grace, knowledge, wealth, and office are distributed in accordance with shared understandings of what they are and what they are for).6 But, all too often, the separations don't hold. The liberal achievement has been to protect a number of important institutions and practices from political power, to limit the reach of government. Liberals are quick to see the danger to freedom and equality when the police repress a minority religion in the name of theoretical truth, or shut down petty-bourgeois enterprises in the name of economic planning, or invade private homes in the name of morality or law and order. They are right in all these cases, but these are not the only cases, or the only kinds of cases, In which liberty and equality are threatened. We need to lookclosely at the ways in which wealth, once political tyranny is abolished, itself takes on tyrannical forms. Limited government is the great success of the art of separation, but that very success opens the way for what political scientists call prrvate government, and it is with the critique of private government that the leftist complaint against liberalism properly begins.
The line between political community and civil society was meant to mark off coercive decision making from free exchange. That's why the sale of offices was banned and the old baronial right to do justice and conscript soldiers was transferred to state officials. And that's why those same officials were denied the right to interfere in market transactions. But it is a false view of civil society, a bad sociology, to claim that all that goes on in the marketplace is free exchange and that coercion is never an issue there. Market success overrides the limits of the (free) market in three closely related ways. First of all, radical inequalities of wealth generate their own coerciveness, so that many exchanges are only formally free. Second, certain sorts of market power, organized, say, in corporate structures, generate patterns of command and obedience in which even the formalities of exchange give way to something that looks very much like government. And third, vast wealth and ownership or control of productive forces convert readily into government in the strict
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sense: capltal regularly and successfully calls upon the coerclve power of the state.' The problem here 1s less importantly a failure of nerve than a failure of perception. Liberal theorists literally did not "see" lndivldual wealth and corporate power as social forces, wlth a political weight, as ~t were, different from thew market value. They almed to create a free market, and thought that they had done enough when they opposed state lnterventlon and set entrepreneurs free. But a free market, In whlch the three klnds of coercion that I listed above are (largely) ~neffectlve, requlres a posrtrve structure. Free exchange won't malntaln rtself; ~t needs to be malntalned by lnstltutlons, rules, mores, and customary practices. Conslder for a moment the religious analogy. The art of separatlon worked agalnst state churches and church states not only by disestablishing the church but also by divesting ~t of materlal wealth and power. Nor did ~t d o thls in the name of private falth alone, but also in the name of congregational self-government. Congregatlonalism 1s by no means the natural or the only possible lnstltutlonal arrangement once church and state have been separated, but ~t IS the cultural form best adapted to and most likely to reinforce the separatlon. Similarly In the economlc sphere: The art of separatlon should work agalnst both state capitalism and the capitalist state, but ~t won't work successfully unless ~t is accompanied by disestablishment and divestment-and unless appropriate cultural forms develop wlthln the economlc sphere. The analogue to prlvate conscience 1s lndivldual enterprise; the analogue to congregatlonal self-government 1s cooperatlve ownershlp.
Without divestment and wlthout cooperatlve ownershlp, the market IS bound t o take shape In ways that defy the art of separatlon. New connectlons are qulckly established. As I have already indicated, these are most importantly connectlons wlth the state, originating now from the market slde rather than the state side, but deep and powerful nonetheless. In addition, unlimited wealth threatens all the lnstltutions and practices of clvil soclety-academlc freedom, the career open to talents, the equality of "homes" and "castles." It IS less overt, more lnsldious than state coercion, but no one can doubt the ready convertability of wealth Into power, privilege, and position. Where are the walls that wall In the market? In pr~nciple, perhaps, they already exlst, but they will never be effectlve until prlvate governments are soclalized, just as established churches were soclalized, that IS, turned over to thelr partlclpants. Religious democracy must find ~t s parallel In lndustrlal democracy. I won't try here to specify any particular set of l n s t~t u t~o n a l arrangements; there are many possible arrangements compatible w~t h the two cruc~al requlrements: that there should be room for the entrepreneur and the new company, just as there 1s room for the evangelist and the "gathered"church; and that there should not be room for the klnd of economlc power that shapes and determines public policy, any more than for the h~g h eccles~ast~cal that routinely a u t h o r~t y calls upon the "secular arm."
With t h~s analogy, we can glimpse a consistent liberalism-that IS, one that passes over Into democratic socialism. But t h~s 1s still a democrat~c soc~alism of a liberal sort; ~t does not require the abolit~on of the market (nor does ~t requlre the abolit~on of religion) but rather the confinement of the market to its proper space. Given an illiberal soc~alism, where the state takes total control of e c o n o m~c life, the same imperative would work in the opposlte way, not to confine the market but to reassert ~t s independence from the political realm. In the United States, then, the art of separatlon requlres the restraint and transformatlon of corporate power. In the S o v~e t U n~o n the same art would requlre, among other thlngs, the liberat~on of lndiv~dual enterprise.
D~s t r i b u t~v e justice 1s (largely) a matter of gettlng the lines r~g h t . But how d o we d o that? How d o we draw the map of the s o c~a l
world so that churches and schools, states and markets, bureaucracies and families each find their proper place? How d o we protect the partlclpants In these different l n s t~t u t~o n a l lntruslons of the settlngs from the tyrann~cal powerful, the wealthy, the well born, and so on? Histor~cally, liberals have taken as then f o u n d a t~o n a theory of individualism and natural r~ghts. They mark out the lines so as to guarantee the secure existence and free actlvlty of the lndiv~dual. Conce~ved In t h~s way, the art of separatlon looks like a very radical project: It gives rlse to a world In whlch every person, every slngle man and woman, 1s separated from every other. Thus Marx: "the so-called rights of man . are simply the r~g h t s of egolstlc man, separated from other men and from the community '" autonomy 1s an intermediate, not an end I n s t~t u t~o n a l polnt In the process of separatlon. The end 1s the lndiv~dual, free w~t h i n h~s or her circle of r~ghts, protected from every sort of external Interference. Liberal soclety, Ideally, 1s s~m p l y a collect~on of these clrcles, held together by all the tangentla1 connections and actual overlappings that their solitary Inhabitants voluntarily e s t a b l i~h .~ Churches, schools, markets, and families are all the products of willful agreements among ~ndiv~duals, valuable because of the agreement they embody but at the same t~m e subject to schism, withdrawal, cancellatlon, and divorce. Relig~ous freedom 1s the r~g h t of the individual to worship his God (the pronoun 1s Important, not because ~t 1s masculine, it can as easily be feminine, but because ~t 1s singular and possessive) publicly or privately, however and w~t h whomever else he chooses; ~t has nothing to do, nothing in particular to do, with the doctrinal and inst~tutional character of Judeo-Christian relig~osity. Academ~c freedom has nothing in part~cular to d o with the university as a social setting; ~t is simply the right of the indiv~dual to study, t o speak, to listen as he or she pleases. All other freedoms are accounted for in similar ways.
Individual agreement 1s Indeed an important source of our institutions, and individual rights of our freedoms. But taken together, w~t h nothing more said, they make again for a bad soc~ology They d o not provide e~t h e r a r~c h or a realist~c understanding of s o c~a l cohesion; nor d o they make sense of the lives indiv~duals actually live, and the rights they actually enjoy, within the framework of on-golng lnstitutlons. The goal that liberalism sets for the art of separation-every person within h~s o r her own c~rcle-is literally unattainable. The individual who stands wholly o u t s~d e lnstltutlons and relationships and enters Into them only when he or she chooses and as he or she chooses: This individual does not exlst and cannot exist in any conceivable s o c~a l world. I once wrote that we could understand a person's obligations by studying his o r her biography, the history of h~s o r her agreements and r e l a t~o n s h i~s . '~~h a t is right, but only so long as one acknowledges that personal h~story is part of social h~story; b~o g r a p h~e s have contexts. The individual does not create the instltutlons that he or shejolns; nor can he or she wholly shape the obligat~ons he o r she assumes. The Individual lives withln a world he or she did not make.
The liberal hero, author of self and of s o c~a l roles, 1s a m y t h~c invention: It is Shakespeare's Coriolanus, that aristocratic warrior and anti-citlzen, who c l a~m s (and fails) to live "as if he were the author of h~mself and knew no other kin."" Turned Into a philosophical Ideal and a s o c~a l policy, this claim has fr~ghtening ~mplications, for ~t is endlessly disintegrative, reachlng a klnd of culmination, perhaps, in recent discussions about the r~g h t s of children to divorce t h e~r parents and parents t h e~r children. But t h~s 1s lndiv~dualism rn extremzs and not likely, I think, to be sustained for long. The liberal hero IS more Important as a sociological pretense than as a philosoph~cal ideal. He or she opens the way for sham descript~ons of churches, schools, markets, and families, as if institutions of this sort were In fact created, and wholly created, through the voluntary acts of ~ndividuals. The sham serves a practical purpose: It rules out state Interference In lnstitutlonal life, slnce the state is In its nature coercive; and it makes ~t very difficult to recognize other, more subtle sorts of Interference (including that imltatlon of the state that I have already referred to as private government). More concretely, it limits the uses of political power and sets money free, for what power takes by force, money merely purchases, and the purchase has the appearance of a voluntary agreement between ~ndiv~duals. In fact, ~t is often something different than that, as we can see if we place the purchase in its context and examlne its motives and effects. And then we are likely to conclude that, just as there are thlngs the state cannot do, so there must be things that money cannot b u y votes, offices, jury dec~s~ons, ulniverslty placesthese are relatively easy-and also the varlous sorts of nat~onal Influence and local dominat~on that go along with the control of cap~tal. But to get the lim~ts r~g h t requlres an understanding of institut~onal life more complex than the one that liberal individualism prov~des.
Churches, schools, markets, and families are social instltutlons w~t h particular h~stor~es. They take different forms in different socletles, forms that reflect different understandings of f a~t h , knowledge, commodities, and kinship obligat~ons. In no case are they shaped wholly by indiv~dual agreements, for these agreements always take place w~thin, and are always constrained by, particular patterns of rules, customs, and cooperative arrangements. It follows from this that the art of separat~on is not rooted in or warranted by indiv~dual separateness (which 1s a b~ological, not a social, phenomenon); ~t 1s rooted In and warranted by soc~al complex~ty. We do not separate lndiv~duals; we separate institutions, practices, relat~onships of different sorts. The lines we draw encircle churches and schools and markets and families, not you and me. We aim, or we should aim, not at the freedom of the solitary individual but at what can best be called inst~tut~onal integrity. Individuals should be free, Indeed, in all sorts of ways, but we don't set them free by separating them from t h e~r fellows.
And yet the separated indiv~dual looks more fundamental than lnstltutions and relationships, a firmer foundat~on for political and social philosophy. When we build from the individual we build, so it seems to the liberal eye, from the ground up. But in fact the ground is always social: persons-in-societies, not persons-by-themselves. We never encounter persons-by-themselves, and the effort to invent them, a strenuous exercise, has no agreed-upon outcome. We d o not know ourselves as strangers to one another, absolute aliens, or isolates, and there is no way to specify or understand what it would mean for such "individuals" to be free. Men and women are free when they live within autonomous institutions. We might take as our model the idea of a free state, one that is not a colony or a conquered land, a state ruled by internal rather than external forces. The inhabitants of such a state are free only in a special and limited sense, but that sense, as anyone who has endured a military conquest knows, is real and important. And if those same individuals live within a state that is internally free (I will try to say what that means in a moment) and if they participate in free churches, free universities, free firms and enterprises, and so on, we will at some point want to say that they are free generally Freedom is additive; it consists of rights within settings, and we must understand the settings, one by one, if we are to guarantee the rights. Similarly, each freedom entails a specific form of equality or, better, the absence of a specific inequality-of conquerors and subjects, believers and infidels, trustees and teachers, owners and workers-and the sum of the absences makes an egalitarian society On the liberal view, men and women are not free in the state so much as from it; and they are equal under the law S o they are protected from political power, conceived as a monopoly of physical force, immensely threatening t o the solitary individual. It is immensely threatening, and I want to say again that the limitation of power is liberalism's historic achievement. But if we turn from individuals to institutions, it is clear that political power itself requires protection-not only against foreign conquest but also against domestic seizure. The state is unfree when power is seized and held by a set of family members, or clergymen, or office-holders, or wealthy citizens. Dynastic, theocratic, bureaucratic, and plutocratic control all make for unfreedom-and for inequality too.
Meritocratic control would have the same effect, though I don't believe it has ever been realized. Compared to family, church, office, and corporation, univers~t~es and professional schools are relatively weak, though the men and women they license are not without political pretensions. A free state, in a complex society, is one that 1s separated from all other instltutions, that 1s to say, astate that is in the hands of its cit~zens generally-just as a free church is in the hands of believers, a free university in the hands of scholars, a free firm in the hands of workers and managers. And then citizens are free In the state as well as from ~t (in fact, it is not as citizens that they are free from the state but as believers, scholars, entrepreneurs, workers, parents, and so on); and they are equal in the making of the law and not only under the law.
The art of separation works to isolate s o c~a l settings. But it obviously doesn't ach~eve, and can't achieve, anything like total sol at ion, for then there would be no society at all. Writing in defense of religious tolerat~on, John Locke cla~med that "the church is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries are fixed and ~m m o v a b l e . " '~ But this is too radical aclaim, deriving, I t h~n k , more from a theory of the indiv~dual conscience than from an understanding of churches and relig~ous practices. What goes on in one i n s t~t u t~o n a l setting Influences all the others; the same people, after all, ~n h a b~t the different settings, and they share a history and a culture-in which relig~on plays agreater or lesser role. The state, moreover, always has a specla1 Influence, for it is the agent of separation and the defender, as it were, of the s o c~a l map. It IS not so much a n~g h t watchman protecting individuals from coerclon and physical assault as it IS the builder and guardian of the walls, protecting churches, universities, families, and so on from tyrann~cal interference. The members of these instltutions also, of cource, protect themselves as best they can, but their ultimate resort when they are threatened is an appeal t o the state. This 1s so even when the threat comes from the state Itelf: Then they appeal from one group of officials or one branch of government t o another, or they appeal against the government as a whole to the body of citizens.
One way of judging the actlons of the state is to ask whether they uphold institutional ~ntegrity-including the Integrity of the state Itself. C o n s~d e r the relat~vely mlnor example of safety regulation. Caveat emptor, let the buyer beware, is, as I said earlier, a rule of the market, but ~t covers only a certain range of wariness. It has to d o with disappo~nt-ment ("I don't look as handsome as I thought I would look In my new clothes"), frustration ("The blurb says this book is 'accessible to the intelligent layman,' so I bought it, but now I can't seem to understand ~t"), and even known and foreseeable risks ("These cigarettes are dangerous to my health"). Clothes and books and cigarettes are properly market commodit~es. But the range of wariness doesn't extend to unknown and unforeseeable risks or to collective r~sks-as in the case, say, of unsafe cars or of cars that contammate the alr. The degree of r~s k that we live w~t h on our highways and In our common envlronment 1s a matter for politlcal decision; ~t belongs, so to speak, to the state and ~t s citizens, not to the market and ~t s buyers and sellers. At least that 1s so on our current understanding, as I understand ~t , of states and markets. The art of separatlon 1s properly artful when ~t draws a line that leaves the r~s k of disappointment on one s~d e and the risk of disaster on the other.
But t h~s artfulness, when ~t comes to concrete cases, is always controvers~al. There are problems of lnformat~on and problems of lnterpretatlon. What goes o n In thls or that institut~onal setting? And what 1s the lnternal l o g~c of what goes on? These questions have to be debated, first In part~cular l n s t~t u t~o n a l settlngs and then In the general settlng of the state. The art of separatlon 1s a popular, not an esoteric, art. Liberals, however, have not always recogn~zed ~t s popular character, for if indiv~dual rlghts are at stake then philosophers and judges can c l a~msome specla1 understanding of ~t s requirements. It 1s the courts that define and patrol the clrcle of rlghts.13 T o focus on lnstltutions, practices, and relat~onsh~ps of agency, to socialize 1s to shift the locat~on the art of separatlon. Believers, scholars, workers, and parents establish and guard the lines-and then the cltlzens as a body d o so, through the politlcal process. Liberalism passes defin~t~vely Into democratic soc~al-Ism when the map of soclety 1s soc~ally determined.
But what if some politlcal majorlty misunderstands or overrides the autonomy of t h~s or that l n s t~t u t~o n a l settlng? That is the unavo~dable r~s k of democracy. Since the lines d o not have the clear and distinct character that Locke thought them to have, they will be drawn here and there, exper~mentally and sometimes wrongly. The line between politics and exchange has, as I have suggested, been wrongly drawn for a long t~m e now: And we suffer from the abuse of market power. We have to argue, then, about the locat~on of the line and fight (democrat~cally) to draw ~t differently. Probably we will never get ~t exactly r~g h t , and the changlng character of states and market requires, In any case, ~t s cont~nual revisions, so the argulng and the fightlng have no visible end.
And what if tyrants selze control of t h~s or that church or un~verslty or company or family? Michel Foucault has recently contended that a dark and r i g~d disc~pline has been clamped down upon a whole series of institutions-and that t h~s is the work of internal elites, professional men and women with claims to sc~entific knowledge, not of political officia~s.'But I think that he exaggerates the success of these elites and their ability to sustain their discipline without calling upon state power. It is only in authoritarian states, which systematically violate institutional integrity, that Foucault's "disclplinary society" is likely to be realized in anyth~ng like the form that he describes. Among ourselves, the risks are of a different sort; they include but are not limited to profess~onal pretension and aggrandizement; we also have to worry about internal corruption, bureaucratic privilege, popular fearfulness, and passivity All of these risks will be reduced, perhaps, insofar as the different inst~tutional settings have themselves been socialized, so that their participants enjoy a rough equality and no group of believers, knowers, or owners is capable of reaching for political power. If men and women enjoy thelr different social roles, they are more likely to respect the settings within which the roles are played. This is the socialist form of the old liberal hope that individuals secure In t h e~r own circles won't invade the clrcles of others. It 1s still a problemat~c but also I think a more realistic hope, for ~t 1s lonely In those circles; the life of instltutlons 1s more lively and more satisfying.
NOTES

